A potential two step argument for God?
There is at least one caused reality: something which exists in virtue of something else. It is, therefore, a dependent reality, insofar as its act of existence is concerned. But not everything can be a dependent reality, otherwise everything (even just collectively) would be awaiting causation before it could exist. But then nothing would exist, because there are no possible causes “beyond everything.” (Take a minute to mediate upon that, if need be.) So, from there being at least one caused reality (a posteriori) we can deduce (a priori) there must be at least one uncaused reality, otherwise nothing would exist, which is contrary to fact (a posteriori). This is a good example of how metaphysical reasoning works: start from some undeniable datum of experience, then work through the logical consequences.
Moving forward. This uncaused reality must be a pure act of existence, existing through itself. This can be shown as follows. If this uncaused reality did not exist through itself, it would exist through another, and therefore be an uncaused-caused reality, which is nonsense. Also, if it were not active – that is, truly present in reality – then it would require activation, and, one again, be dependent/caused. So whatever else this uncaused reality is, it must be a pure act of existence, existing through itself. Why pure? Simply because if there were any aspect of it which were different from the act of existence, existing through itself, that aspect (part, power, dimension, etc) would, by default, not be an act of existence, exiting through itself, and therefore be caused.
So, this uncaused reality must be a pure act of existence, existing through itself. Also note, that because this reality is not susceptible to any differentiating features, it must be absolutely unique – that is, one and only one. For to have multiple instances of something, there must be some way of telling those instances apart; i.e. through differentiating features. But since a pure act of existence, existing through itself, is not susceptible to differentiation, it is not susceptible to multiplication.
At this point, one wonders if we could jump straight to deducing the divine attributes via pure actuality, and I think that might be plausible. It seems we already have enough in place to argue this uncaused reality cannot be composed of any potency (that which could be, but isn’t) whatsoever, otherwise we succumb to the same dilemma: positing an uncaused-caused reality. If we attempt to put some potential part in this uncaused reality, we will either have to drop back to something more fundamental which actualizes that potential (re-initiating our causal regress), or admit the strange conclusion that there exists a potential part which cannot be actualized. But that is not really a potential part at all, is it? For a potential must be that which can in principle be actualized, and so what we’re positing is literally nothing, which once again returns us to a reality that is purely actual. And once we have pure actuality – that is, no admixture of potentiality whatsoever – we can then deduce all the classical divine attributes, as I do in How to Think About God.
This argument might be too quick — I count two steps: 1) there must be an uncaused caused; 2) but only a purely actual reality can be an uncaused cause – in which case, further arguments can be marshaled for the same conclusion, but it’s attractive to me, as a minimalist. I suppose we may just need to insert the causal principle that whatever is brought from potency to act requires something already in act, which seems eminently secure.
– Pat
PS – For the sake of argument, suppose someone posits some finite reality as the uncaused cause, whether an electron, or the initial singularity, or whatever have you. I see multiple problems with such naturalist proposals.
Remember: whatever else this uncaused reality is, it must be a pure act of existence, existing through itself. We can now ask whether an electron or any other finite, physical thing could be a plausible candidate. To me, the answer seems obviously in the negative, and here’s why. Concerning electrons, they are clearly act-potency composites, since they are changeable/mutable realities, moving from actual states to potential states. Same with the initial singularity. Same with any material/physical being, by default. So, any physical reality is ruled out in virtue of always being an act-potency composite, and not pure actuality as such.
Problem number two concerns the traditional real distinction between any finite essence and its act of existence. because, as Norris Clarke reminds us, any finite essence stands in potency to an act of existence – that is, a capacity to receive existence to some limited degree, or in some restricted way, etc. If, on the other hand, we’re to say that to exist = “to exist an electron” we are then committed to the absurdity that anything exists must exist as an electron – even more specifically, as *that* particular electron. In other words, only that electron could exist. But this is unacceptable, because other realities are not only possible, but actual. By this we should conclude that whatever else it means to be an electron, is not identical to existence as such, but distinct from it. The finite nature of “electron” is merely a capacity to receive existence; it is a restriction upon existence and therefore distinct from it; i.e. caused. Now what is true for the electron would be true for any finite, physical reality.
Finally, Rasmussen offers his suggestion from modal uniformity for why the uncaused-cause cannot be material.
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