One of the dividing lines surrounding George Floyd’s death is whether rioting — either generally, or specifically — is morally justified. What has, however, thankfully not been a dividing line (so far as I can tell) is that justice is owed for Floyd’s death. Virtually every person I’m associated with — liberal, conservative, libertarian; it’s a lot — had been, and still are, in loud, unanimous agreement that an egregious moral catastrophe occurred in the handling, and death – what, in fact, seems the literal murder – of George Floyd.
Naturally, the question of whether rioting is morally justified is not something that can be given a two-minute response. Context is required to make a fair assessment of a situation like this, and, before that, some careful consideration of competing moral frameworks (consequentialism, deontology, natural law, etc). All said, my position as of today is the current riots are not only not justified, but actually damaging to the justice George Floyd is owed.
Allow me to make a few preliminary comments before we continue.
People sometimes wonder why I am not more quick to comment upon contemporary political issues and/or candidates, since 1) I have a platform, and 2) I have a background in philosophy, including ethics. That is a fair question to ask, so allow me to answer it.
The truth, in fact, is I am quite quick to discuss contemporary political issues and candidates, if only when I believe my voice can affect some positive difference. (I write for different websites, on different issues, remember.) but generally, and when it comes to my public persona, I strive to remain a-political, not because I feel contemporary political issues and candidates are unimportant, but because I don’t want politics to interfere with my overall message and mission.
What’s more, I try awfully hard to resist the urge to make myself appear morally righteous by releasing outrage on social media and then leaving it at that. I may be engaging in armchair psychoanalysis (classic case of projection, perhaps?), but it seems to be that people frequently abdicate their moral responsibility on political or societal issues by supposing an anger-infused Facebook rant or politically loaded email is sufficient. It isn’t.
So, just because I do not normally discuss contemporary political debates on my public platform does not mean they do not concern me, or that I am doing nothing about them. Aside, if I were to discuss the daily instances of injustice that disturb me, I would have nothing else to talk about – literally, my entire platform would be consumed by political commentary and moral philosophy. None of which is to say I do not see myself as having any possibly important role to play in the cultural conversation. Rather, I choose to do so in the way I believe is effective and unifying: that is, when topics of philosophy come up, I focus on general metaphysics and ethical reasoning, which goes beneath contemporary political issues and candidates, and focuses on the deeper principles of things. My (perhaps naïve) hope is that by providing the philo-theological foundations of the moral life, people can then make better, more ethical decisions on the contemporary issues themselves. Perhaps I am rationalizing, but I take the same approach, generally speaking, with fitness: If you can get the fundamentals figured out, you’ll have a far easier time on any specific issue.
So, I care very much about injustices of racism and brutality whenever they occur, just as I care very much about the ongoing, radical injustice of abortion (itself a racist issue in many respects; PP began with an appalling agenda of eugenics, let us remember). To me, these are altogether insane neglects of human dignity, part in parcel of the same “throwaway culture” that Pope Francis talks about. They disturb me to the core.
And — now, finally getting into the topic at hand — just as I would condemn pro-lifers using force against Planned Parenthood (though Planned Parenthood, it should be noted, is directly responsible for the killing of innocents, whereas community small-business owners are not directly responsible for the death of George Floyd), so do I condemn anybody using force to seek justice for George Floyd when that force is directed at innocent parties. (Also, the more I see of these riots, the more I wonder how much these rioters really are seeking justice for George Floyd, rather than hijacking an otherwise peaceful protest for nefarious political ends. Also, yes: rioters =/= protesters.). I draw these parallels if nothing to show I am consistent — or, at least mostly consistent — when it comes to the issue of aggression. But being consistent does not mean being correct. Perhaps I am wrong, and the use of aggression is morally justified?
For one thing, I do not say aggression (force, rioting, violence, etc) is never morally justified. In fact, I would argue there are instances when aggressive is not only appropriate, but expected; I would just deny the rioting currently underway meets the necessary standards of justifiability. It is, after all, a fundamental principle of any “Just War” to never inflict harm directly or intentionally unto innocents. So, it is not violence per se that is the problem, but rather the object of that violence.
Let me bring in an example.
Recently on Facebook a (now former) associate posted a meme encouraging the riots, under which some enthusiastic friend of his responded with the utilitarian cliché of sometimes needing to break a few eggs to make an omelet. I called his reasoning into question — and him seriously depraved — if only because when consequentialism is taken to its (il)logical terminus, such ethical reasoning could just as easily be used to support the murder of George Floyd. Imagine: “Because our country requires structural change, perhaps Floyd’s murder was the necessary broken egg our country needed to spur the creation of a new societal omelet.” To be fair, I don’t believe this was the intention of my interlocutor, but, given a consequentialist ethics, once the utilitarian horse is let out of the barn, there is no principled way to reign him back in again. So, we must resist any and all leaning in this consequentialist “ends justify the means” direction. Utilitarianism is deeply immoral and beyond irrational.
Let me also be clear that I believe punishment can be – and often is – merited. In fact, I will go so far to say that in certain instances of injustice, even the death penalty should be considered. (Notice, briefly, that a person can be pro-life and pro-death penalty, because the question is ultimately one about deserts and innocence. That, however, is a topic for another time.) The point is simply this: for punishment to be just, punishment must be deserved. So, if we say a person has been justly punished, it’s only because that person has done something which makes him or her worthy of punishment received, not because the punishment may deter a future crime or establish order. Such latter considerations may be a welcome side-effect of punishment, but they can never merit punishment itself. To be morally licit, any punishment must first itself be merited by a person through the actions they’ve committed (or failed to commit, when morally expected of them; for example: child abandonment), otherwise undeserving people will be punished as means of deterrent, which is contrary to justice (giving to someone their due). This applies no less on a family level as it does for society itself. When I punish my children, it is not *just because* I hope to deter some future, immoral behavior, but because they have done something which merits the punishment. Of course, I hope such punishment does deter some future, immoral behavior, but I only punish – first and foremost – because punishment is due.
If we care about justice, then we must care about justice, full stop. And so, I take it to be a basic axiom of moral reasoning that one does not repay injustice with injustice. Of course, the common rebuttal to this (I think obvious) point is to highlight some historical instance when people have indeed affected some positive change by inflicting violence, even unto innocents. (The example given in the thread I mentioned was the Boston Tea Party, which seems to be making the rounds, again, lately.) And, this may be true — in fact, I think there are cases when it undoubtedly has been true that violent ends produced arguably positive outcomes — but even so, that would not make the initial action morally justified. For just as I may be able to more quickly or efficiently cure a certain disease by performing medical experiments on involuntary subjects – the outcome of which would be considered positive by many people – does not make my action of enslaving and experimenting on involuntary subjects morally permissible. Certain actions are, and must be, judged, independently of outcome. So, it not inconsistent to say something good came out of an immoral action; sometimes that does happen. But that does not make the preceding action any less immoral. (Historical note: whether the Boston Tea Party was justified depends, again, in part, on whether the aggression was directed at responsible parties, instead of the direct harming of innocents. One historian has a perspective on that issue here. But whatever the case happens to be, there is no reason to assume, uncritically, that America was founded entirely on moral actions.)
If we care about human dignity then we must care about human dignity, full stop. To ignore the dignity of innocent humans in attempt to enact justice for people ignoring the dignity of innocent humans is self-defeating and actually stupid. Finally, it must be acknowledged that many people have themselves enacted large-scale, positive societal change through peaceful means, as well. MLK is frequently brought up; and yes, I am familiar with his quote of rioting being the voice of the unheard, though he himself condemned violent protests. That quote may be true; in fact, I think it many cases it is true. But that would not justify the current rioting. For actions can be understandable, in one sense, and still unethical, in another.
– Pat