We are free in a libertarian sense and not determined causally by any factor that is both prior to and logically sufficient for our choosing (x). But we can be free in a libertarian sense only if divine simplicity is true. So, divine simplicity is true.
For brevity’s sake, I’ll assume the initial premise, appealing only to those who already committed libertarians. In other words, I want to show how a commitment to libertarianism can be sustained only by a simple and immutable God. (I will be borrowing from the work of Matthews Grant.)
What it means to be libertarian free.
Grant writes, “According to the broad account: An act is free in the libertarian sense if and only if its agent performs the act voluntarily and intentionally, and either the act is not determined (i.e. there is no factor both prior to and logically sufficient for the act), or the act is determined and the agent’s responsibility for the act derives from the agent’s voluntary and intentional performance of some prior act that was not determined.” (pg. 10)
Obviously, then, to be not-libertarian free or determined is for there to be a factor that is both prior to and logically sufficient for some act.
Most atheists/naturalists are determinists because they believe that whatever else our action consists of, it reduces to material factors that are both prior to and logically sufficient for that action. That everything leading up to our action (movement of particles, etc) is the irretractable cause of that action and that we could not have done otherwise. Such preceding material factors – if that is all there really is to the human account – would come prior to our action and be logically sufficient for it. It is therefore difficult if not impossible to see how naturalism does not entail determinism.
As Brandon Vogt puts it in his critique of Sean Carrol’s poetic naturalism: “[if] we knew the positions and velocities of all the particles in the universe, understood all the forces they are subject to, and had sufficient computational power to apply the laws of motion, then we would not use ‘free will’ language—we would agree that everything is determined.”
The falsity of mainstream materialist determinism coincides with the falsity of his materialism generally and other half-baked metaphysical commitments, so I will not speak any further to that. Instead, let’s turn to theistic alternatives, which also seem to inevitably introduce some factor that is both prior to and logically sufficient for human action.
In his book, Grant examines what he takes to be a popular conception of God (what he calls PM for popular model), wherein any instance where “God causes E” the following will be true:
- God
- E
- God’s choice, decree, or intention to bring about E, which is intrinsic to God, is that in virtue of which God causes E and which would not exist were God not causing E
- The causal-dependence relation between God and E.
Quoting Grant, “The point to appreciate now, however, is that, when coupled with divine universal causality, PM clearly rules out a creaturely act’s being free in the libertarian sense and that’s true whether we follow the strict or broad account. For DUC implies that every creaturely act is directly caused by God. And PM implies that fore very creature effect E that is caused by God, there is a factor – God’s choice or decree (or etc.) – that is both prior to and logically sufficient for E. This factor is prior to E, since it either causes E or is that in virtue fo which God causes E. This factor is logically sufficient for E, since it is not possible for the factor to occur or obtain with E’s occurring or obtaining. It follows that DUC and PM imply that every creaturely act is determined.” (pg. 56)
OK, then. PM, I argue, applies to virtually any model of God that is not classical theism, and especially it applies to theistic personalism, where God can somehow change intrinsically. The issue is with c – some intrinsic feature of God that is both prior to and logically sufficient for some effect E – and that puts in God a contingent accident, less we embrace modal collapse. So, not only does PM entail determinism, but it violates the metaphysical conclusion that God is pure. It makes God into something less than God and all creatures determined.
What is Grant’s solution? To return to divine simplicity and push all contingency extrinsic to God. Enter the “extrinsic model,” wherein any instance that “God creates E” only the following needs to exist:
- God (with God’s reasons for creation)
- E
- The causal-dependence relation between God and E.
Here, as Grant argues, we have everything we need to make sense of God creating E, but that anything which could have been otherwise is extrinsic to God. God choosing E *just is* E’s existing and being caused by God, and same with God’s intending E, knowing E, etc. (Analogical predication when it comes to God, remember!). Had God not chosen E, E would not exist, but God would remain essentially the same. Thus, EM not only preserves divine simplicity in light of contingent creation, and safeguards divine impassibility and immutability, and so on, but it bears significantly on how libertarian freedom can exist, as well, because on EM there is no factor both prior to and logically sufficient for E.
God is not logically sufficient for E, because God is compatible with E not existing. God could have willed otherwise and not have been changed in doing so. E is obviously logically sufficient for E, but E is not prior to E. So, no issue there. Same with the causal-dependence relation – whether that be logically sufficient for E (because it coincides with E’s existing) it is not prior to E, so there is no issue there, either. So, on EM there is no factor both prior to and logically sufficient for E, which means E (say, our act of choosing) could have been otherwise all antecedent conditions remaining the same.
Predictably, Grant explores all the possibility of there being a factor leading to determinism on EM in far more significant detail than I, so turn to his work if you want the extended treatment. For now, my job is complete. For it is difficult if not impossible to see how anything aside an absolutely simple and immutable God could provide the grounds for human libertarian freedom. Naturalism can’t do it, nor do most naturalistic assume that it can, and theistic personalism (or PM) faces an irresolvable dilemma: either accept some mutable factor in God (itself absurd) which is both prior to and logically sufficient human action and thereby determining human action, OR render God impotent and put something beyond the divine universal causality. Neither alternatives are metaphysically or experientially acceptable. And so, we conclude that God is absolutely simple and humans libertarian free.
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