- Causation is a matter of dependency relation.
- Whatever is the effect depends on — or in some sense, derives from — the cause(s).
- As Anscombe puts it, “… causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes. For example, everyone will grant that physical parenthood is a causal relation. Here the derivation is material, by fission. Now analysis in terms of necessity or universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the effect; rather it forgets about that. For the necessity will be that of laws of nature; through it we shall be able to derive knowledge of the effect from knowledge of the cause, or vice versa, but that does not show us the cause as source of the effect. Causation, then, is not to be identified with necessitation. If A comes from B, this does not imply that every A-like thing comes from some B-like thing or set-up or that every B-like thing or set-up has an A-like thing coming from it; or that given B, A had to come from it, or that given A, there had to be B for it to come from. Any of these may be true, but if any is, that will be an additional fact, not comprised in A’s coming from B. If we take ‘coming from’ in the sense of travel, this is perfectly evident.”
- As noted, effects are not demanded by their cause(s). They are only dependent upon them and rendered intelligible by them. This is apparently the case when it comes to agent causation and libertarian freedom – the ability to choose (x) or not-(x) based on reasons. Plausibly, it is true of phenomena in quantum mechanics, as well, statistical explanations, etc.
- Of course, this assumes we are talking about causes as substances CAPABLE of producing effects. But inasmuch as an effect IS produced such an effect is demanded by the cause (since, in a strict sense, to be called a cause is to be simultaneous with an effect of some kind or other) — this is true, but trivial. Obviously, if something IS generated it cannot (in the same aspect) be not-generated. However, this is not to say it couldn’t have been otherwise prior to generation.
- Example: If I choose to pick up the apple and am picking up the apple, then my ACTING as cause is SIMULTANEOUS with the effect I am producing (my picking up the apple is the same thing as the apple being picked up, just seen from differing perspectives), and so the effect is necessitated in THAT sense. But that does not mean prior to my judgment I had to pick up the apple. I could have picked up a papple (hybrid of apple and pear).
- Example 1: The pot is hot because the fire heated it. The causal property of heat has been derived from (and is dependent upon) that which possessed that causal property essentially — namely, fire — being in contact with it. Had the fire not come into contact with the pot, the pot would not have been heated, less something else with that causal property had been there to pass it along.
- Example 2: I chose to give my wife flowers instead of candy because I favored the reason that flowers last longer over the reason that candy tastes good. I could have given my wife candy (all antecedent conditions remaining the same) but freely decided not to. The effect of my wife getting flowers is dependent upon, and rendered intelligible by me, the cause, favoring a reason, though I could have done otherwise. The effect is still dependent upon the cause in this case even if not demanded by it.
- Whatever is the effect depends on — or in some sense, derives from — the cause(s).
- From another perspective, causation amounts to the actualization of some potential – the realization of some possibility of being – by something that is already actual, something already realized, existing, and capable of producing an effect.
- This analysis of causation, which underlies the causal principle that “whatever is reduced from potentiality to actuality is actualized by something already actual” is necessarily true, since 1) from nothing, nothing comes, and 2) potential being qua potential has no actual causal power, otherwise it would not be potential but actual. Think: My potentially writing this article does nothing to teach you about causation unless and until the article is actually written! Thus, no potential can be responsible for something actual. Therefore, only that which already actually is (in some sense) could bring about some possible reality.
- Note: this causal principle is not affirmed inductively but deductively by eliminating two of the three logically exhaustive candidates as metaphysical impossibilities, ensuring the third. In other words, we do not conclude that “whatever is reduced from potential to actual is actualized by something already actual” because we see some extensive number of examples of this in experience (though surely we do) and no clear counter examples (also true), rather we see that among the three conceptual alternatives (actual being, potential being, and nothing) only one is metaphysically tenable for producing an effect. Because we can be certain that nothing comes from nothing and that potential qua potential has no actual causal ability, the ONLY LOGICALLY POSSIBLE option is that something comes from something that already, actually is.
- Regarding the Humean suggestion that because we can conceive of something coming from nothing, therefore the principle of causality is undermined, a brief response borrowing from Ed Feser is in order: To wit, to conceive of an effect without simultaneously conceiving of its cause does nothing to show that it is metaphysically possible for an effect to exist without a cause, anymore than conceiving of a man without simultaneously conceiving of his height does anything to show it is metaphysically possible for a man to exist without having a height — obviously, that is not metaphysically possible. Thus, the move from conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not just question begging, but false.
- Regarding the objection that quantum mechanics undermines the principles of causality, because it shows things (particles) can begin without a cause, here a brief reply may also be given. For it is untrue that quantum mechanics shows that things can exist without a cause; rather, quantum mechanics (at most) shows that effects are not demanded or necessitated by their underlying cause(s), which is consistent with the causal principle, or simply that the underlying cause might not be obvious, which is also consistent with the causal principle. In the case of certain particles spontaneously emerging, this takes place, as some physicists propose, because of underlying energy states. In short, it is a misunderstanding to say they emerge from nothing because they emerge spontaneously. Spontaneous causation is not something coming from nothing.
- Furthermore, to deny the causal principle is also to deny the principle of sufficient reason, which, as philosophers have argued, entails a radical, self-defeating skepticism. In short, if things can happen uncaused (and for no intelligible reason whatsoever), then why couldn’t our thoughts happen uncaused (and for no intelligible reason whatsoever)? But if that is the case, then why should we trust any of our thoughts, including the thought that things and events can happen uncaused? There is no escape: the causal principle that “whatever is reduced from potential to actual is actualized by something already actual” is always and everywhere true.