The Argument of Contingency for the Existence of God
On today’s podcast, Tom asked what I think the most important question is that a person can ask. I told him I thought the most important question a person can ask, is the question that Leibniz said was the most important question a person can ask: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On that podcast, I attempted to trot out what would be Leibniz’s response, commonly known as the argument from contingency, which is a philosophical proof (read: “logical demonstration”) for the existence of God. I already got a few emails about this, asking to go a little more in depth—people, apparently, became curious. And since philosophy is my pet, I was delighted at the request, and excited by the challenge.
I believe the argument from contingency is one of the very more powerful and convincing arguments for the existence of God, an argument that has not only stood the test of time, but even been improved by contemporary scholars in some ways, such as Bernard Lonergan, Peter Kreeft, etc. I won’t claim to be able to offer it as well as they have, but I can get you started, at least.
The Argument of Contingency for the Existence of God
I’ll begin the argument from an informal statement:
The universe exists. But does it have to exist? Couldn’t we imagine the universe not existing? Couldn’t we imagine nothing instead of something? Or, couldn’t we imagine a universe with different laws and different planets and different creatures? If so, then it doesn’t seem like anything about our universe is necessary. And if nothing within the universe is necessary, and if the universe is just all the things within itself—all of space and time—then the universe itself is not necessary. And if the universe itself is not necessary, then it does not explain itself. So, there must be something that explains the universe. But for something to explain the universe, it cannot be a part of the universe, since we’ve determined nothing within the universe explains the universe—the universe, it seems, is contingent; it is, but doesn’t have to be. So, for something to explain the universe it would have to be beyond the universe; it would have to be beyond space and time. But for something to be beyond space and time, and to be the ultimate, explanation of all contingent things, is to be something that just is. In other words, subsistence existence itself.
And that, philosophically, we know to be God.
More formally stated:
Anything that exists must have an explanation for its existence, either through an external cause, or a necessity of its own being.
So, if the universe exists, it too must be explained either by an external cause or a necessity of its own being.
But the universe does exist and is not explained by a necessity of its own being (we can imagine the universe not existing or existing in different ways.) Therefore, the universe is contingent.
And no contingent thing can be explained by an infinite series of continent things, because that wouldn’t explain why any contingent thing exists at all.
So, the explanation of all contingent things must end in at least one necessary thing–one necessary thing, beyond space and time.
But to have at least one necessary thing is to have only one necessary thing.
And that one necessary thing is God.
The logic of the argument is valid. So, the only thing to assess is whether the premises are true. If they are true, the conclusion follows, and is also true. If they are more probably true, the conclusion is more probably true. If they are more probably untrue, the conclusion is more probably untrue–at least by this argument. If they are not true, the conclusion is not true—again, at least not by this argument.
(A quick note about philosophical argumentation, before we begin. Because very rarely will the presenter of an argument be able to offer a demonstration beyond any level of refutation, there is always an appeal that can be made to extreme levels of skepticism. Therefore, the task of someone making an argument is not to “prove” something beyond all doubt [like a mathematical proof, say], but to raise the intellectual stakes, so to speak, that to deny the argument, or any part of the argument, would land the objector in a jungle of absurdity. In other words, the goal is to prove something beyond reasonable doubt. So success is had simply when an argument is more plausibly true than its negation, not when it is absolutely insusceptible to negation of any kind.)
So, are the premises true? Or are they at least more probably true than not? Well, let’s see.
Premise 1: Everything that exists must have an explanation for its existence, either through an external cause, or a necessity of its being.
Our experience would tell us this premise is true. For example, when we look for explanations of things, we tend to find them. This is known as the principle of sufficient reason. But somebody might deny the principle for sufficient reason, and that’s fine, they can do that. But to deny the principle of sufficient reason is to expect things to have no explanation for why they exist (or are they way they are); to imagine that things can just pop into existence—or out of existence—without an explanation. Has anybody experienced this? I kind of doubt it. If so, then I might reasonably concern myself with the possibility of a moose to just popping into my living room at any time. I would just say, hello moose, but wouldn’t bother asking how he got there, because why should I?
But I’m not worried about a moose just popping into my living room, and if it did happen, I would ask the moose how he got there, even knowing full well that he’s a moose, and unable to explain the situation, I would still ask, because I would want an explanation. Unless there existed something like teleportation, in which case there would be an explanation for why a moose popped into my living room, thus validating the principle of sufficient reason. But so far as I know, teleportation doesn’t exist, so I needn’t worry about a moose just popping into my living room, because there is no reason why a moose would do that. So that’s at least one less thing to be paranoid about.
Also, if the principle of sufficient reason were not true, we would not be able to trust our faculties, and have no reason to engage in science or philosophy. But we do trust our faculties and do engage in science or philosophy, because our senses are (generally) reliable, and because the principle of sufficient reason, it seems, is true.
Or, how about this: If the principle of sufficient reason weren’t true, and we stumbled upon a decapitated corpse, we wouldn’t need go through the trouble of staging any kind of murder investigation, because why expect an explanation for a decapitated corpse? It just is. “Oh, look, a mutilated corpse!” would simply be followed with, “Oh, look, a moose!” And you would never ask how these things got there.
But hold on, because you would ask how these things got there, wouldn’t you?
So far, I see no reason to think that the principle of sufficient reason isn’t true, less a person adopts a severe (and unreasonable) position of skepticism.
(Explanatory aside: The principle of sufficient reason isn’t about something having a “cause”, per se, because a cause isn’t always what we mean by explanation. An explanation is something which makes some phenomena intelligible, whether we know of a cause or not. So the PSR holds even within, say, quantum mechanics. Because while quantum phenomena may, in some interpretations, be indeterminate, they are still intelligible—such is why we have the laws of quantum mechanics.)
Typically, the only people who would deny the PSR are those dogmatic atheist scientism-y types who, by doing so, destroy the very equipment needed to validate their enterprise. So, again, it seems the principle of sufficient reason is true. At least more plausibly true than no.
Premise 2: So if the universe exists, it too must be explained either by an external cause or a necessity of its own being.
Does anybody deny the universe exists?
Premise 3: But the universe does exist and is not explained by a necessity of its own being (we can imagine the universe not existing or existing in different ways).
There is nothing through either philosophic contemplation or scientific investigate that shows our universe to be necessary—in other words, that it explains itself. Because for anything in the universe that we seek explanations for, we tend to find them. And for those explanations we tend to find more explanations. And so on, and so forth. But this matter of explaining one contingent thing by another contingent thing can’t go on forever, because then no explanation for why any contingent things exist at all would be given. So, there must be at least one necessary being to explain the existence of all contingent things. But for there to be at least one necessary being is for there to be only one necessary being, since a necessary being would have to be absolutely simple and just that which is—in other words, subsistent existence itself—so in principle could not be more than one.
Philosophically, we would know this being to be God.
To this, the objection might be raised that the universe does explain itself. But again, how? Nothing about the universe—nothing about the laws of physics or any of the stuff in the universe, like bugs or antelope or matter in general—explains why the universe continues to persist at any moment in time, either at all, or in the way that it does. You still need something to exnihilate the entire operation. And to be clear, this argument is not about what “started” the universe, but what “sustains” the universe; what holds it all together, so to speak.
At this point, a person might appeal to something like the multiverse, saying our universe might just be one of many—really, an infinite number—of bubble universes, springing from some big fat momma universe. But this is not a relevant objection. If anything, it merely pushes the argument back a step, because the multiverse (if actually does exist) would just be yet another continent thing in need of an explanation. This is why it’s important to understand this is a metaphysical argument—not a specific physical argument—so it needs not use the example of “the universe” to be made. You could just as easily make the argument using any one thing inside the universe—for example, my coffee cup. Why does my coffee cup exist; what holds it in being? The “universe”, at least for our argument, is just a way of saying “all contingent things.”
Finally, somebody might say, OK, I follow you so far, but why must that necessary thing be God? Couldn’t it just be a pool of ectoplasm or something? At first, this seems like a substantial objection. But presently you’ll see why it has no force.
First, to be a pool of something—and particularly a pool of ectoplasm, which is physical—would be to be material. And we’ve already seen that that which is subsistent existence itself is beyond the material. So no such pool of ectoplasm will suffice as the ultimate explanation of things, and neither would a flying pasta monster or Thor. All these things are silly caricatures which do not seriously engage the argument.
To say it another way, for something to exist, there must exist what it takes for that thing to exist. And because the ultimate explanation cannot be less than the things that it explains, we conclude that that which explains must be intelligent, etc. So through further philosophical probing of the argument we can uncover attributes of this ultimate, necessary explanation—attributes that philosophically define God. Not theologically, but philosophically. What I mean is the argument for contingency can only tell us that there exists what it takes for anything to exist, and that thing is God, but it doesn’t tell us whether that God is the God of Christianity or Judaism or Islam, for example. You’ll need other arguments for that, which is fine, because that isn’t what this argument is supposed to solve. All this argument is supposed to solve is that theism (existence of God) is more probably than atheism (the non-existence of God). And so far, I think it succeeds.
– Pat
Related Links and Resources
The Most Important Question You Can Ask In Life?
Five Proofs for the Existence of God
Yet another fallacious argument for an imaginary friend. Not what I subscribed to this fitness feed to read….time to move on.
http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/ash-againstcosmological.shtml
I appreciate your comment but would—if I might offer just one bit of advice—be careful of your approach. You seem upset, and, just, you know, I wouldn’t want any of my readers to think that atheists are prone to acting erratically off unruly emotions, or anything. I want objectors treated charitably and not as children, so that they might be given a fair shot. But that’s hard to accomplish when someone comes in attacking strawmen (“imaginary friend”) and, rather than providing any rebuttal to my argument, links out with hopes that someone else can do it. It shows—frankly, it shows a certain level of immaturity.
And while I’d normally spare myself from responding to links pointing to God (yes, the one and only) knows where on the internet—because neither do I have the time, nor the interest, to engage in every conceivable objection, from every conceivable objector—but since I find this one particularly silly, I’ll highlight a few points, just so nobody is fooled by what are some really bad arguments.
The main problem with this person’s objection is he mistakes refuting an argument with ignoring it. But before we can even get there, he severely misconstrues what Aquinas said—even though, funny enough—what I demonstrated is Leibniz’s argument, not Aquinas’s; which is another mistake: He doesn’t seem to know that these are, in fact, different arguments. But suppose you’d gotten this right, or that he’d gotten this right—or, if God saw fit to throw a miracle upon us, that you’d both gotten it right—and suppose we had been talking about Aquinas’s argument, particularly his argument from change—which, I repeat—is a different argument than the one contingency. (One premises an explanation, the other, a cause, which I have already said are different, though occasionally overlapping, things.)
So, it’s important to separate the two of these out, otherwise someone might not take your argument seriously. Because one relies on the actualization of potential, the other an explanation to make a phenomena intelligible. And he seems to be arguing against one to refute another. That’d be like me saying President Nixon was wrong about monetary policy because XZY therefore mud is tasty. It just doesn’t make sense. They’re not the same argument, so the refutation (even if it was valid on Aquinas’s argument; it’s not) doesn’t follow.
But let’s get to some specifics. For example: “Another important point to make is that Aquinas says that nothing can be infinite, and then goes on to say that God is infinite.”
The problem with this claim is it would be more compelling if the blogger had actually read some Aquinas, before making comments about him. In fact, Aquinas very much believed something could be infinite, at least in theory. Which is why Aquinas expressed many times, very clearly, that he DID NOT BELIEVE you could philosophically demonstrate the universe was NOT eternal. And that’s exactly why NONE of his arguments rely on a universe with an absolute beginning. (This mistake is apparent as early in the blogger’s second paragraph: “The first implies that there must have been a first cause in time.” This couldn’t be more inaccurate.)
“That the world (universe) began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration (philosophy) or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.” – Aquinas (Summa theologiae I.45.2)
So, all this guy’s talk about “the big bang” or whatever misses the point, because he has no understanding of the argument—no understanding of the Aristotelian notion of accidental vs hierarchical causal series, or anything, it seems. He’s arguing against an argument that he invented, not Aquinas.
Now, I would be remiss if I failed to mention that Aquinas would certainly be heartened by modern big bang cosmology, if he had lived to see it. Because he did, in fact, believe (on faith) that the universe had a beginning, but he never relied on that article of faith to advance his philosophical arguments.
But the errors continue!
For example: “We should accept that the Big Bang is the first cause that we know about.”
Again, let me be clear, the argument I demonstrated has nothing to do with the absolute (temporal) beginning of the universe—I don’t know how many times I’ll need to keep repeating this, but since this point of confusion is so common among objectors, it deserves as much restatement as it can get. So, this objection is irrelevant; but it does show you’ve misunderstood the argument, otherwise you would not have linked to someone else who misunderstands the argument, who references only a very long line of philosophers who also, classically, misunderstand the argument. But let’s say we do want to bring the big bang into it. Well, the argument stands! Because the big bang itself—to use Aquinas’ argument—is merely the actualization of some potential, and following the argument (least when properly understood), requires that the actualization of some potential can never be a sufficient starting point, because only that which is purely actual, and not a mix of actuality and potentiality, could, in principle, not require a cause. Everything else does. So, this is exactly what I mean when I say this person has mistaken what it means to refute an argument, with simply ignoring it. Because if they understood the argument, they’d understand why the big bang can’t, in principle, be a “brute fact.”
One more, just for fun, then I gotta eat. “It is simpler to posit a simple, axiomatic principle as that cause, instead of the complex entity that is God.”
Wrong for two reasons. First, all these arguments point to a God that is absolutely simple and non-composite. So, I don’t know where this objection is coming from, because it’s certainly not addressing the conclusion arrived at by either the argument form contingency, nor the argument from change. I see some lines in there about the Bible, but in no way do these arguments rely on anything from Scripture, so it’s silly to use the Bible as a source of refutation, especially since so many atheists claim religious people shouldn’t use the bible as a means of argument or refutation themselves. But here we are. Second, “a simple, axiomatic principle”—we have one!
One last thing, not about the argument, but something else you said: “Not what I subscribed to this fitness feed to read… time to move on.”
I’m sorry, but in what way does the quality of my advice about fitness have any connection to my philosophical view on God? And in what world do you need to agree with somebody on everything, to find value in the things you do agree on, or want to learn about? It seems again that you’re coming from a confused and emotional point of view on all this—a classic case of “angry-but-not-very-well-thought-out-atheism.” Are your feelings really that fragile? Because my musings on philosophy, or meatloaf, or exotic cats, in no way conflict or restrict the amount or quality of information I provide on fitness, and you or anybody else are free to ignore whatever you don’t want to hear me talk about. But don’t expect me to change my views, just so you won’t be offended. Not going to happen. Either you’re adult enough to accept that people—yes, even people you admire in one area—will often have different views—views you may very well frown upon—in other areas. Some of my greatest mentors, and greatest friends, possess wildly opposing political and philosophical views than I. And as much as I may disagree with them, it would be a tremendous disservice to write them off as friends, in general, or mentors, in specific. I wish you well.
What I love about this blog is I can learn the kettlebell swing and one post and something about philosophy of religion the next. Keep the eccentric content coming, Pat. It’s true to your concept of Generalism. Would love to hear your thoughts on heart rate monitors at some point, whether you use them or not.
Pat, I am in awe with your approach on things, not a lot of people bother to discuss the depth of sensitive topics like these. It kind of annoys me to talk to close minded people but you seem to be the type open for a healthy discussion where you’ll listen to one point, validate or rebut you may but I see you as someone I’ll learn a new perspective or too. And yes, I agree with you on “that theism (existence of God) is more probably than atheism (the non-existence of God)” and definitely love how on point you are with the discussion isn’t specifically talking about what kind of God it is, but just the idea of God. Keep that mind going, Pat! Love your thoughts.
Thanks, Cheska. I think it’s important, particularly on such hot topics like religion and politics (and yes, fitness,too) that we continue to engage in conversation with those of whom we may severely disagree. Otherwise we land ourselves in a situation of either bland toleration, on the one hand, or shouting and violence, on the other. And while bland toleration may be preferable, none of these are particularly productive. But a return to a sort of good old fashioned “religious argument” can be productive–I’ve seen it happen many times. In fact, it worked on me! Thanks for chiming in : )
Pat, I appreciate you approaching this from a philosophical angle. In an earlier blog you discussed personal experience vs. scientific research and how the two sometimes clash. My personal experience is that God exists. I have witnessed answers to prayer, lives changed around based on follow Jesus Christ’s teachings, and the sheer beauty of the universe. There’s also the fact that so far, scientists haven’t found life on other worlds and it seems like Earth is just perfect for life. So why not anywhere else? I know you’re not arguing for anything but the existence of God (as opposed to narrowing it to a particular God). I did enjoy your explanation and while I don’t understand it all, it’s a good and stimulating read.
This brings up an interesting point, and you’re absolutely right in your assessment: What I’m arguing for would be known as The God of Philosophers. And sometimes a non-believer might object, “OK, sure, but everything you just said doesn’t mean the God of Christianity is true.” And to that I would say, “And your point?” The only reason for this argument is to show that atheism is more probably false, and that theism–or, more particularly, monotheism–is more probably true. It’s not to establish the God of Christianity or Islam or Judaism. But it at least narrows the field, from which you can then go on to weight other evidence. This was precisely the path that brought me out of my atheism. First, I realized the arguments for God were better than the arguments against–that is, when I truly took the time to understand them. From there, I realized the arguments for Jesus and His resurrection were better than those against. That’s my (massively truncated) conversion story.
I would have to agree with most of the arguments you laid out (which you did beatifically, if I might add). You really approached this from a philosophical angle, which I found unique and refreshing. If one wanted to pursue this topic further, are there any resources you might suggest? You offered a comprehensive introduction, but I would love to dive further into this on my own time and challenge my own personal beliefs with new philosophical arguments.
Sam, yes. I think Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction is a good starting point. Or, for something a little less text-booky, try Ed Feser’s Aquinas, which I thought was fantastically done. Thanks for reading.